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 RM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8507
 INFO RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 132
 RUHJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 208
 RUSBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3821
 RUQOET/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 132
 RUSBL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1840
 RUSHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1468
 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1609
 RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6160
 RUHNDT/USMISSION USUN NY 3878
 BT
 CONFIDENTIAL ANKARA 7248

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/1/85 (KEX, DENNIS) OR-F
 TACE: MCPS, PEPR, TJ, AF, OR, PK
 SUBJ: (C) TURKISH VIEWS ON USSR-AFGHANISTAN:FOLLOW-UP
 REF : (A) STATE 250377, (B) STATE 250400, (C) ANKARA 7201

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE (SEE PARA 7).

3. SUMMARY: POLOFF FOLLOWED UP REF(C) DEMARCHE WITH WORKING-LEVEL MFA OFFICER WHO HAD SERVED IN AFGHANISTAN DURING THE TARAKI REVOLUTION. THE OFFICIAL STATED THERE WAS SUPPORT WITHIN THE MFA FOR A TURKISH DEMARCHE TO THE RUSSIANS ON AFGHANISTAN, BUT THERE WAS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF A PUBLIC STATEMENT. THE TURKS WERE VERY INTERESTED IN OTHER COUNTRIES' VIEWS ON AND RESPONSES TO THE SITUATION. THE MFA OFFICIAL SPECULATED ON POSSIBLE RUSSIAN INTEREST IN ETEMADI, FORMER AFGHAN AMBASSADOR TO PAKISTAN AND THE USSR, AS A REPLACEMENT FOR AHM. END SUMMARY.

4. GOT-USSR DEMARCHE: MFA MIDDLE EAST SECTION CHIEF ALP KARAOZMANOGLU INFORMED EMBOFF (RICCIARDONE) SEPTEMBER 28 THAT THERE WAS STRONG SUPPORT WITHIN THE MFA FOR AN UNPUBLICIZED DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS ON AFGHANISTAN. HOWEVER, SINCE THE FORMIN WAS NOW IN NEW YORK, IT WOULD TAKE TIME BEFORE A FINAL DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN. IT WAS VERY UNLIKELY THAT THE GOT WOULD MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN. THE GOT WAS VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN OTHER COUNTRIES' REPRESENTATIONS (IF ANY) TO THE SOVIETS ON THE SUBJECT OF AFGHANISTAN. KARAOZMANOGLU REACTED VERY POSITIVELY TO THE DEPARTMENT'S SEPTEMBER 19 PRESS STATEMENT AS A SIGN OF US INTEREST IN THE AFGHAN SITUATION.

(COMMENT: THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION KARAOSMANOGLU MADE IT CLEAR THE GOT WOULD LOOK FAVORABLY UPON INCREASED US INTEREST AND INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE FORMER CENYO REGION (SEE ANKARA 720) (NOTAL)).

5. USSR INTERVENTION: KARAOSMANOGLU REITERATED THE GOT'S BELIEF THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT SEND MILITARY FORCES INTO AFGHANISTAN UNLESS A CRISIS DEVELOPED IN WHICH RUSSIAN LIVES BECAME THREATENED. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS WERE LOOKING FOR ANOTHER HORSE TO BACK IN VIEW OF ANIN'S NARROW BASE OF SUPPORT. THE TURKS BELIEVED THAT ETEMAADI, FORMER AFGHAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW AND LATER TO ISLAMABAD, WOULD BE A LIKELY CANDIDATE AND THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE AT THE MOMENT " TRYING TO GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM". KARAOSMANOGLU SAID ETEMAADI HAD RETURNED TO KABUL FROM PAKISTAN THE DAY BEFORE THE TARAKI COUP, AND HNS BEEN IN JAIL SINCE SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HE ADDED THAT ETEMAADI HAD HAD EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS AND MIGHT HAVE HAD CONTACTS AMONG EXTREMIST PARCHAMIST GROUPS IN EXILE IN MOSCOW. KARAOSMANOGLU ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT OF ETEMAADI AS A SUCCESSOR TO ANIN.

6. MILITARY INSUBORDINATION INCIDENT: THE TURKS HAD HEARD THAT SOME 20 AFGHAN PILOTS HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN ASSIGNED THE MISSION TO BOMB HERAT DURING THE TROUBLE THERE SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. THE PILOTS DELIBERATELY DROPPED THEIR BOMBS OFFTARGET, RETURNED TO BASE, AND WERE REPLACED BY RUSSIAN PILOTS WHO BOMBED THE ASSIGNED TARGETS IN DOWNTOWN HERAT. THE AFGHAN PILOTS WERE SUMMARILY EXECUTED FOR THEIR INSUBORDINATION.

7. ACTION REQUESTED: PER PARA 5 EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S EMBASSY KABUL'S COMMENT ON TURKISH VIEW THAT SOVIETS MAY BE CONSIDERING ETEMAADI AS POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT FOR ANIN.

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